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BOILERPLATE, FREEDOM OF CONTRACT,
AND "DEMOCRATIC DEGRADATION"
Brian H. Bix *
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW (2012). Pp. 360. Hardcover $35.00.
INTRODUCTION
In Margaret Jane Radin's provocative new book, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Van-
ishing Rights, and the Rule of Law,' the author offers scathing observations regarding the
motivation and effects of the terms placed in consumer and employee form contracts and
on-line agreements. She argues that the current contracting practices make a mockery of
consent, and undermine the rule of law. 2 Boilerplate's essential claim is that for many
contracting parties, freedom of contract is less an ideal than a sham. 3 The book properly
criticizes theories of contract law (and courses in contract law) that largely ignore boiler-
plate and its problems despite the pervasiveness of such terms in modern contracting
practice.4 In the process of making her argument, Radin offers an impressive tour across
modern contracting practices, Contract Law doctrine, Contract Law theory, political the-
ory, and populist advocacy. Boilerplate is a book from which all readers could benefit,
whether or not they ultimately agree with every one of the author's analyses and conclu-
sions.
As is the norm in these sorts of reviews, I will treat most of the important positive
* Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minnesota. A short portion of
this review appeared, in modified form, as part of a May 2013 Symposium on Boilerplate at Contract Profs
Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof blog/2013/05/boilerplate-symposium-vi-brian-bix-on-
democratic-degradation.html. I am grateful for the author's response to my posting that occurred as part of the
Symposium: http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof blog/2013/05/boilerplate-symposium-x-b-
professor-radin-responds-to-week-ii.html, and also for the excellent work of the editors of the Tulsa Law Re-
view.
1. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2013).
2. As part of her sharp critique of the complete or relative absence of consent by those receiving these
standard and on-line terms, Radin urges that such terms and the legal ties that arise from them not be called
"contractual." See id. at 242. While I understand and appreciate the analytical and rhetorical motivation for that
move, I will not be following it in this review.
3. RADIN, supra note 1, at 7-9.
4. I raise a similar objection in BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 12846
(2012) [hereinafter BIX, CONTRACT LAW]. For an excellent discussion of Radin's point regarding the connec-
tion between contracting practices and contract theory, see Robin Kar, The Challenge of Boilerplate,
JURISPRUDENCE JOTWELL, Sept. 3, 2013, http://juris.jotwell.com/the-challenge-of-boilerplate/.
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aspects of the book as given, summarizing and discussing them only briefly, while focus-
ing on some doubts and criticisms, even if these are minor relative to the overall merits
of the work. In particular, this review will raise questions regarding whether some of
Boilerplate's accusations are overstated in ways that distort the analysis offered.
Part I looks at the issue of "boilerplate" (a term Radin and others5 use as a broad
term to refer to provisions placed by vendors into standard form contracts and provided
through various forms of contracting; I will follow this usage) and how it affects issues
of freedom of contract and consent. Part II briefly considers Radin's accusation that boil-
erplate undermines the rule of law and democratic legitimacy. Part III considers some
possible responses to the problem of boilerplate, including tort remedies and administra-
tive regulation.
I. BOILERPLATE, CONSENT, AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
What does it mean to have freedom of contract, and its corollary, "freedom from
contract?" 6 The general notion of the idea (or ideal) is well-enough understood: that in
contract law, unlike most other areas of law, the rights and duties we have derive from
our own choices rather than being imposed upon us. This aspect of contract law ties that
social practice (and the related practice of promising)7 to the ideal of autonomy; that is,
self-governance. The ability to enter enforceable contracts, and to choose the terms, also
enhances autonomy and liberty by encouraging cooperation that will help parties achieve
individual and shared objectives. There are well-known limits to the extent to which
freedom of contract should be, or is, reflected in contract law: e.g., the need for objective
standards of formation (and modified objective standards of interpretation for contractual
terms) entails that there will be occasions when parties will be bound by contracts and
contractual terms that vary from those to which the parties subjectively thought they
were committing.8
The question is whether current contracting practices raise additional and more
central challenges to the idea of freedom of contract. 9 Today, for most people, most of
the time, contracting practice is a matter of standard form contracts, small print terms,
terms provided on websites (where, commonly, one must click a box to express assent,
though sometimes the terms are simply posted without any expression of assent being
requested or required), and terms inserted in the containers of goods, which cannot be
seen until after the purchase. And it has been widely acknowledged that almost no one
reads these terms (neither the parties that receive the terms, nor the parties that supply
5. See, e.g., BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
6. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Foreword: Freedom From Contract, 2004 Wisc. L. REV. 261 (2004).
7. The connection between a contract and a promise remains a controversial area. See, e.g., Michael G.
Pratt, Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations, 26 L. & PHIL. 531 (2007); see also Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARv. L. REV. 708, 719-29 (2007).
8. Cf GRANT GiLMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 45-49 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1995) (describing the
rise of the objective approach); see also Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000).
9. Radin would reject reference to "freedom of contract" in reference to regulating boilerplate, for much
the same reason that she prefers not to call such terms "contractual." See RADIN, supra note 1, at 242. Once
again, I will not be following her example in this review.
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them), and that even if one were to read the terms, one would be unlikely to understand
their significance (especially if one lacked legal training, but even lawyers might be
hard-pressed to fully understand many of these terms). 1 There is little sense of the au-
tonomy ideal here: parties are frequently ignorant that there are in fact terms, and almost
always uncertain as to their meaning and significance. One can hardly speak of such par-
ties as having chosen their contractual rights and duties.
The concerns relating to modern contracting practices extend far beyond issues of
formation (many parties being unaware that there even is a contract, or aware that there
are terms that apply beyond the simple exchange of money for the good or service). The
substance of the terms found in these standard forms, click-through agreements, browse-
wrap agreements, terms in the box, etc., include significant limitations of liability, waiv-
ers of warranties, assent to mandatory arbitration, waivers of the right to bring claims in
class actions, indemnification clauses, hold-harmless clauses, and waivers of other sub-
stantive and procedural rights. One need not search all that hard to find outrageously
one-sided provisions-so outrageous that courts refuse enforcement when the provisions
come to their attention." Companies that provide such provisions may know well in ad-
vance that their provisions are unenforceable, but assume that they have little to lose in
such overreaching, and much to gain, if consumers, employees, or other contracting par-
ties are persuaded or intimidated by such terms into not pressing valid claims.
At the same time, it should be noted that freedom of contract seems perfectly con-
sistent with the use of different kinds of forms or other ways for presenting terms, and it
has always been viewed as consistent with some substantive limits on the enforceability
of terms. In a sense, freedom of contract is as alive as it has ever been. In regard to the
problems Radin indicates, someone might argue that if people do not want to be bound
by the terms on the "click-through" screen, or the insurance policy, or the many pages of
the apartment lease or cell phone user agreement, they need only refrain from entering
agreements with those vendors in the first place. Individuals are subject to those obliga-
tions because, and only because, they chose to accept them. On the other hand, for most
of us it is neither easy nor prudent to go without cell phone service, insurance, up-to-date
software, an apartment, and so on. Once one chooses to have the goods or services in
question, one often discovers that there is no effective choice regarding the terms. 12
10. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the Decision to Trust the Courts: The Case Against
Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms, Especially for Software, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 753, 757-58 (2004)
(summarizing the substantive and procedural fairness problems with boilerplate terms). As Omri Ben-Shahar
points out regarding the individual party's knowledge and consent, the alternative to boilerplate may be no bet-
ter: without express contractual terms on the subjects, questions about performance, breach, remedies, and so
on, would be covered by the default doctrinal rules, which are likely no better known to the contracting parties
and equally difficult to understand (especially, though not exclusively, for those not legally trained). Omri Ben-
Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia (book review) [hereinafter, Ben-Shahar, Regulation],
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=2255161; see also Randy E. Barnett, Consent-
ing to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 627, 644 (2002) ("[i]n assessing the enforceability of form con-
tracts, we must never forget that contract law is itself one big form contract that goes unread by most parties
most of the time").
11. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing to enforce extremely
one-sided arbitration provision). Radin also recites some examples of egregious language. RADIN, supra note 1,
at xiv-xvi, 12-15, 29-30, 111-19.
12. Examples include all the insurance company policies and all the cell phone service agreements includ-
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Freedom of contract is connected with the ideas of consent and choice. We consent
in the fullest sense of that term when we choose among reasonable alternatives; have full
knowledge of those alternatives; and our choice is not distorted by coercion, manipula-
tion, or misrepresentation. For the reasons already alluded to, there is little doubt that
with the vast majority of contracts entered into today (especially when considering con-
sumers and employees), one would not speak of the parties as having consented to the
terms of the agreement in the fullest sense of "consent."' 3 Parties may not know that
their actions have subjected them to (further) terms, they have not read or do not under-
stand the contractual provisions, and the uniformity of terms across an industry that sup-
plies important goods or services means that parties may have no reasonable means to
avoid being subjected to particular terms.
Like the weather, boilerplate seems to be something consumers and academics like
to talk about, but no one does anything about. In earlier articles-widely read by aca-
demics, but seemingly having little effect on judges and lawmakers-Friedrich Kess-
ler,' 4 W. David Slawson,' 5 and Todd Rakoff,' 6 among others, argued for a radical doc-
trinal response to the problem of standard forms and boilerplate, involving the non-
enforcement or significant regulation of those sorts of provisions. Arthur Allen Leff ar-
gued that contracts should be treated like things: that the combination of the goods being
sold or the services being offered, combined with the contractual terms modifying rights,
should collectively be seen as products to be governed by product liability or similar
regulation. 1 Leff's suggestions have had as little effect outside the academy as have
those of Kessler, Slawson, and Rakoff. By contrast, Karl Llewellyn' 8 and Randy Bar-
nett' 9 argued that boilerplate provisions should be largely enforceable, on the basis that
the other party has given "blanket" or general assent to all "not unreasonable" terms in
form contracts. The Llewellyn and Barnett positions more closely describe what courts
have done for decades, and what they continue to do, when faced with standard forms
and other types of boilerplate provisions.
Radin, in Boilerplate, returns to this battlefield, taking up the radical cause for sub-
stantial regulation or significant non-enforcement. She argues against the status quo: the
ing the same waivers of rights. Radin makes similar points. RADIN, supra note 1, at 39-41.
13. I discuss the matter at greater length in Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 251-67 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). Radin discusses that article briefly.
RADIN, supra note 1, at 96-97. I do not agree with the way Boilerplate characterizes my views in that article,
but I will spare readers the details of this exegetical squabble.
14. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629 (1943).
15. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 529 (1971).
16. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983).
17. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970).
18. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960) (arguing that
while there is not true assent to boilerplate clauses and only true assent to a few dickered terms to the broad
type of transaction, there is "blanket assent" to all not unreasonable terms); see also RADIN, supra note 1, at 82-
83 (discussing Llewellyn's views).
19. Barnett, supra note 10. Barnett's analogy is to a person assenting to whatever is written on a piece of




general presumption of enforcement, and the (often unstated) assumption among judges,
lawmakers, and many academics that some combination of market forces and reputation-
al sanctions will work to deter oppressively one-sided terms. 20 Radin doubts the effects
of markets and social norms, and questions the apologists who state that one-sided terms
are equated with a greater supply or cheaper cost for the goods and services with which
boilerplate terms are associated. 2' Radin also adopts something like Leff's suggestion
that contracts be treated like products, where there would be remedies for "defective"
contracts that cause harm. 2 2 Additionally, she offers an argument similar to Slawson's
that form contracts are like private legislation-an improper delegation of public power
that raises rule of law concerns. 2 3
Radin expresses concern about the lack of substantial consent by consumers to
boilerplate terms created by large businesses, and she is outraged by the use of boiler-
plate provisions to circumvent the substantive rights and remedies consumers, employ-
ees, and other contracting parties would otherwise have.' Radin's ultimate conclusions
are harsh: boilerplate provisions are contrary to the basic principles of contract law, con-
trary to basic principles of the rule of law, and destructive of the public-private distinc-
tion needed to legitimate private ordering. 25
When thinking about contract law, consent, freedom of contract, etc., it is im-
portant to distinguish three separate concerns that Radin discusses: (1) contracts which
contain terms in which one party waives substantive or procedural rights that the party
would otherwise have; (2) the presentation of those waivers in difficult legal language,
often in small print, as part of a long legal document full of similar provisions; and (3)
such terms being presented within packaging that is received after the product is paid for,
or on a web site that the party seeking the goods or services may reasonably fail to no-
tice. 26
As for the waiver of rights, it should be remembered that one aspect of freedom of
contract, or at least a central aspect of contract law that is analogous to freedom of con-
tract, is the idea that parties should be able, at the time a contract is entered, to choose to
limit or otherwise alter their liability for breach of contract.27 Parties need this power in
order to determine whether to enter an agreement at all, or the terms (especially the price
terms) on which they will enter an agreement. Thus, in the famous case of Hadley v.
Baxendale,28 the court held that if a contracting party was not informed, at the time the
20. RADIN, supra note 1, at 189.
21. Id. at 31-32.
22. See id. at 23, 197-215; Leff, supra note 17.
23. See RADIN, supra note 1, at 33-51; Slawson, supra note 15, at 530.
24. The ability of vendors to remove consumers' rights has been enhanced substantially by the United
States Supreme Court's robust reading in recent years of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-
14 (2008). See, e.g., Am. Exp Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013); AT&T Mobility,
L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776
(2010); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006). The topic of the FAA will be
considered in greater detail in Part II.
25. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 1, at 35-39, 173-74.
26. See id. at 10-12 (giving examples of different kinds of contracts raising these concerns).
27. See Barbara Fried, What's Morality Got to Do With It?, 120 HARv. L. REV. F. 53, 54 (2007).
28. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 (1854).
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contract was entered, about damages potentially much higher than that party would rea-
sonably expect, then those higher levels of damages would not be recoverable.29 Free-
dom of contract-or just "contract"-is at its essence about the ability of parties to set
the terms of their interactions, at least within broad boundaries.
Vendors will argue that their clauses limiting consequential damages, preferring
arbitration (and no class action arbitration) to a right to litigate, and selecting a forum
convenient to the vendor, etc., are all about reducing costs or potential costs to the ven-
dor, allowing vendors to offer lower prices on goods, or, for employers, more hiring, or
hiring on better terms. Radin responds that, at best, there is no evidence that the limita-
tion and waiver of terms in fact results in lower costs for goods or higher wages for em-
ployees; the suspicion is that the result is merely more money for large corporations. 3 0 In
any event, Radin argues, it is both unseemly and contrary to democratic principles for
consumers and employees to be cornered into selling off all their substantive and proce-
dural rights for a handful of nickels. 3 '
I think Radin is basically correct on the essence of the charge in Boilerplate: that it
is a sham to speak about consumers and employees (and franchisees and others) "con-
senting"-in any robust sense of that term-to the provisions which strip them of their
rights and impose one-sided provisions on them.32 Radin correctly states that transac-
tions involving boilerplate terms "are very far from the traditional notion of a contract,
the idea of bargained exchange by free choice."3 3 It is likely, however, an overstatement
(though perhaps not a vast overstatement) when Radin reports that modern contracting
has led to:
[A] process of devolution or decay of the concept of voluntariness....
[where] consent is degraded to assent, then to fictional or constructive
or hypothetical assent, and then further to mere notice . . . until finally
we are left with only a fictional or constructive notice of terms.34
When Radin argues that boilerplate provisions should not "be considered contrac-
tual,"3 5 it has the rhetorical and paradoxical force of "property is theft"3 6 or "an unjust
law is not a law."3 7 As to the latter, the argument is that an unjust law is not "law" in its
fullest sense (creating moral obligations to obey). Similarly, one might argue, a transac-
tion in which one side may not know that there are terms, does not understand the terms,
29. This has become known as the test of "Hadley foreseeability"-whether damages were "reasonably
foreseeable" at the time the contract was entered into.
30. RADIN, supra note 1, at 31.
31. See id. at 32.
32. See id. at 31.
33. See id. at 12.
34. Id. at 30.
35. Id. at 14.
36. This quotation is associated with anarchism in general and the writer Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in particu-
lar. See, e.g., PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, PROPERTY Is THEFr!: A PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON READER (lain
McKay ed., 2011).
37. See Norman Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex: Laws on Trial in Aquinas' Court of Conscience, 33
Am. J. JuRIs. 99, 101 (1988).
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and is in no position to find or negotiate for different terms, is not a "contract" in the
fullest sense of the word.
In Boilerplate, Radin quotes some extreme one-sided provisions and notes that
some of these provisions, and claims of tacit agreement, would not hold up in court, but
comments that this just shows the brazen over-reaching of the businesses that provide
these terms. 38 As earlier noted, these businesses risk little-at best (from the businesses'
perspective), consumers and employees will be convinced by the one-sided terms; at
worst, the unenforceable terms will not be enforced, but the companies will otherwise
face no sanction for their overreaching. 39 At the same time, it may be authorial over-
reaching to indict businesses generally on the basis of the most extreme language used
by only a handful of companies, especially when it is conceded that such language is not
enforceable.
Whatever the concerns regarding boilerplate provisions-and they are many-the
question that must be kept in mind is: What are the alternatives? Would greater efforts to
bring terms to the attentions of consumers create frustrating delays? 40 or, for that matter,
would there be even minimal discernible effect? 4 1 Maybe we are all in such a hurry to
purchase or download from the Internet that prior disclosure of terms (even in clearer
language) would not deter us from acting in haste, and then regretting in leisure.
What if consumers and employees had a choice: for a consumer, where the goods
either came with waivers of rights but a lower price, or with no waivers and a higher
price; for an employee, where waivers of rights might come with a lower salary? The
limited evidence indicates that much more often than not, consumers and employees
would take the economic benefit now rather than the greater rights later. 42
Radin points out that some of these choices might be explicable through the now
well-known observations about our "bounded rationality."43 Human beings tend to un-
der-estimate the likelihood of some types of events and over-estimate the likelihood of
other types-to value more highly an object or entitlement when we have it, and to have
our reactions to options strongly influenced by the way those options are framed. In
many ways, we are far from the "rational actors" that populate the models of economists,
as well as the models of many legal scholars. Those who sell us products and services
38. See RADIN, supra note 1, at 29-30.
39. See id. at 13.
40. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) (requiring disclosure prior to
purchase would be impractical and serve little purpose); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th
Cir. 1996) (suggesting that a requirement for prior disclosure of terms "would drive prices through the ceiling
or return transactions to the horse-and-buggy age.").
41. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
647, 649-51 (2011) (discussing problems with mandated disclosures across many areas); but cf Robert A.
Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Web Site Disclosure of e-Standard Terms Backfire?, in
BOILERPLATE, supra note 5, at 94 (admitting that disclosure can have minimal or even counter-productive ef-
fects in the short term, but can nonetheless have positive effects over the long run).
42. See Ben-Shahar, Regulation, supra note 10, at 15.
43. See RADIN, supra note 1, at 26-29. On bounded rationality and related ideas, see generally DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); and JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69
Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
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systematically take advantage of our weaknesses and irrationalities in these areas.44
Most of us do not worry as much as we should about post-employment restrictive cove-
nants, choices of forum for dispute resolution, or waivers of rights to bring class actions.
We assume that nothing will go wrong, that the vendors or employers would not put in
unfair terms, and at least that we will be treated fairly if anything goes wrong. For a large
portion of transactions, those assumptions turn out to be true.45 However, when those
assumptions turn out to be false, the outcome can seem deeply unfair and troubling.
II. BOILERPLATE AND "DEMOCRATIC DEGRADATION"
Radin is also concerned about "democratic degradation," by which she means the
way in which important legislatively-created rights can be (enforceably) diminished or
waived through contractual agreement.46 Her argument is that businesses should not be
able to undo, through simple contractual provisions (especially provisions that are hid-
den, hard to understand, and hard to avoid), rights which have been created through pop-
ular, democratic law-making processes.47 The problem with this argument is that the
ability to modify or waive these rights is itself also the direct or indirect product of legis-
lation. The most obvious example is the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 48 which is the
basis for enforcing the arbitration agreements that Radin complains about that waive
consumers' and employees' rights to litigate claims in court and to bring class action
claims. 49 (Of course, one might disagree with the reading of the FAA that the majority
of the Supreme Court has given, but that is a separate issue). Similarly, Congress and
state legislatures clearly have the ability to make the right to litigate certain claims or to
bring class actions non-waivable, and have occasionally done so. For example, Congress
has forbidden mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer credit agreements with
members of the United States military.50 One can also find state laws that expressly re-
strict the ability of parties to waive procedural and substantive rights, at least for certain
categories of transactions. 5 1
44. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN
CONSUMER MARKETS 7-8 (2012).
45. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets,
in BOILERPLATE, supra note 5, at 6.
46. See RADIN, supra note 1, at 33-51. She also argues that some of these waivers of rights "erase the legal
rights that form the infrastructure that makes contractual private ordering possible," and that firms using such
waivers "are using contract to destroy the underlying basis of contract." Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted).
47. See id. at 39-40.
48. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2008).
49. Radin discusses some of the history of the FAA and some recent case law. RADIN, supra note 1, at 130-
35.
50. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 987(e)(3), (f)(4) (West
2010 & Supp. 2013). Federal law elsewhere also limits other sorts of provisions that might modify rights. See,
e.g., 46 U.S.C.A. § 30509 (West 2008 & Supp. 2013) (invalidating provisions limiting liability for personal
injury or death relating to transportation of persons between ports in the U.S., or between a U.S. port and a non-
U.S. destination). Recently enacted federal legislation and administrative agency action prohibiting mandatory
arbitration provisions in mortgage and home equity loans are cited in RADIN, supra note 1, at 246. See also the
Magnuson Moss Federal Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301-12 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013) (as discussed by
RADIN, supra note 1, at 185, 220), which places some constraints on how businesses present warranties to con-
sumers.
51. One example is the Illinois Franchise Act, where Section 4 states: "Any provision in a franchise agree-
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Someone might object that the argument here is putting too much argumentative
weight on the fact that federal or state legislatures have not acted to restrict the effect of
contractual boilerplate, and that one should not make too much of legislative inaction.
Lawmakers fail to act for many different reasons (including the partisan gridlock one
sees at the national level at the moment, preventing almost any legislation of even mod-
erate controversy). Discounting failure to act is a fair point, and one not to be brushed
aside lightly. At the same time, the fact that state and federal legislatures have shown the
ability and willingness to restrict the use of certain kinds of boilerplate language52 means
that the failure to do so in other circumstances is at least noteworthy.
At times, Boilerplate seems to recognize the tension within the claim regarding
"democratic degradation." When analyzing the use of "technological protection
measures" ("TPMs," also known as "digital rights management" ("DRMs")), Radin
writes: "As they exist today, TPMs are inimical to the rule of law, and therefore a cause
of democratic degradation. As they exist today, they are accorded stringent protection by
treaty and by US legislation under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act." 53 Thus, Ra-
din notes that this practice has express or implicit support by federal legislation and na-
tional treaty obligations, but still claims that the practice undermines political rights.54
These claims may be consistent, but only if one shifts the argument to the way our politi-
cal system operates (such as the corrupting influence of campaign contributions and hy-
per-partisanship, etc.) 55 rather than claims about contractual provisions.
Radin does have a back-up argument here; however, it focuses less on campaign
finance and political corruption and more on a controversial conception of "the rule of
law"56 and what she asserts the rule of law, properly understood, requires for private law
generally and the enforcement of contracts in particular.57 However, those who do not
accept Radin's controversial views about the Rule of Law may find her argument here
unpersuasive.
ment that designates jurisdiction or venue in a forum outside of this State is void, provided that a franchise
agreement may provide for arbitration in a forum outside of this State." 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/4 (West
2008 & Supp. 2013). Another example is the Wisconsin Consumer Act, which invalidates all choice of law,
choice of forum, and choice of venue provisions for consumer contracts entered by Wisconsin residents. Wisc.
STAT. ANN. § 421.201(10) (West 2012 & Supp. 2012).
52. Additionally, Congress has sometimes offered express permission to have certain types of claims re-
solved by arbitration or other forms of alternative dispute resolution. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
includes the following language: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chap-
ter." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12212 (West 2013).
53. RADIN, supra note 1, at 50.
54. Id.
55. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (holding that the First
Amendment prohibits limits on corporate funding of independent political broadcasts). And the influence of
corporate campaign contributions has been felt strongly in those states that elect their appellate court judges-
exactly the judges Radin hopes might intervene to protect consumers and employees from boilerplate. See Jo-
anna Shepherd, Justice at Risk: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions 1
(2013), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/ACS Justice at Risk 6_24 13_0.pdf. At one point, Radin
suggests, quite reasonably, that the ultimate culprit for the pervasiveness and enforcement of one-sided boiler-
plate might be the severe wealth disparity in this country. RADIN, supra note 1, at 152.
56. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004) (discuss-
ing the different understandings of "the rule of law").




What can be done and what should be done in response to the problems created by
boilerplate provisions? Radin entertains the possibility of strengthening traditional forms
of oversight-judicial application of existing doctrines, state legislative restrictions on
some provisions, and agency review of provisions-but she considers these options to be
unlikely or inadequate.58 Radin briefly surveys other options: (1) market mechanisms,
e.g., consumer watchdog groups, and the use of reputational sanctions; 59 (2) the use of
tort law;60 and (3) administrative regulation, e.g., creating lists of acceptable, unaccepta-
ble, or presumptively unacceptable boilerplate provisions;61 she finds advantages and
disadvantages in each.
The possibility of substantive regulation is not entirely fanciful or utopian. The Eu-
ropean Union responds to form contracts with a series of directives creating mandatory
terms, presumptively invalid terms, and prohibited terms, particularly for consumer
transactions.6 2 However, even putting aside the merits of that proposal, there are serious
questions as to whether this alternative would be politically feasible in the United States
in the short or medium term. Some version of federal regulation with the objective of
consumer protection was to be one of the functions of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau ("CFPB"),63 but Republicans in Congress have (at the time of this writing, and
for some years previous) made it a high priority to try to prevent this agency from gain-
ing effective power or independence from Congress.64 The CFPB is managing to pro-
duce some important regulations relating to financial products,65 but it is difficult in the
current political climate to imagine its having the impact on consumer transactions gen-
erally that its European counterparts have.
To those who would complain-against regulation-that parties should be free to
agree to (or at least assent to, if one finds transactions involving standard terms too far
58. See id. at 144-53.
59. See generally id. at 189-96.
60. See generally id. at 197-216. As Radin nicely puts it, with perhaps some overstatement: "Receipt of
boilerplate is often more like an accident than a bargain." Id. at 197. Radin suggests that a "firm that imposes
severe remedy deletions of rights that are at least partially market-inalienable, under circumstances of noncon-
sent and mass-market distribution, could be liable in tort for intentional deprivation of basic legal rights." Id. at
211. For a similar suggestion of a tort approach to regulating contracts, this time in connection with insurance
policies, see Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies,
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007) (mentioned by RADIN, supra note 1, at 199 n.7). See also Leff, supra
note 17 (one of the first articles to suggest a product liability approach to standard form contracts).
61. See generally RADIN, supra note 1, at 217-42.
62. Id. at 233-39; see also Jane K. Winn & Brian H. Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting
in the U.S. and E.U., 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (2006); see generally THE INVOLVEMENT OF EU LAW IN
PRIVATE LAW RELATIONSHIPS (Dorota Leczykiewicz & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2013).
63. The Bureau is mentioned briefly in passing in Boilerplate. RADIN, supra note 1, at 221.
64. See Editorial, Quietly Killing a Consumer Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2013,
www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/opinion/quietly-killing-a-consumer-watchdog.html. After years of the Republi-
cans blocking the appointment of someone to head the Bureau, Richard Cordray was finally confirmed as its
head on July 16, 2013, as part of a compromise meant to avert a change of the Senate's filibuster rules. Dan-
ielle Douglas, Senate Confirms Cordray to Head Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, WASH. PosT, July
16, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-16/business/40608755 1 senate-republicans-consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-richard-cordrayPoST.
65. Information on the agency's past and proposed regulations can be found on its website. See CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2013).
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removed from full-blooded "agreement" or "consent") whatever terms they want, one
should point out that this is not the current state of the law and has not been for centuries,
if ever.66 There have always been limitations on the process of contract formation, and
the terms that would be enforced, under the guise of various doctrines (e.g., duress, un-
due influence, unconscionability or laesio enormis, public policy or illegality, misrepre-
sentation, and the various equitable defenses to the (full) enforcement of contractual
terms).
It should be pointed out, in passing, that when terms are imposed by legislation,
administrative regulation, or judicial rewriting, the outcome may be terms that are fairer,
or at least less one-sided, than boilerplate terms, but the problem of lack of full consent
has not disappeared.67 Neither party to an agreement assents in any meaningful way to
terms imposed by the State, however fair or reasonable the terms might otherwise be. 68
Whether one responds to problematic contractual terms through doctrine, or legis-
lative or administrative regulation, one option that should be considered is differential
treatment of contracts depending on the parties involved. The European Union currently
does this, as many of its protective rules apply only to consumer contracts.69 One might
go in the other direction as well, and for some, less vulnerable contracting parties, one
might consider relaxing some doctrinal constraints we now have. One can be in favor of
true freedom of contract for parties sophisticated enough (or sufficiently well-counseled)
and powerful enough to recognize what the implications are of what they sign, and to ob-
tain alternative terms if the present terms are not to their liking. These are parties who
come close to fitting the ideal of "true" or "full" consent that was earlier noted as being
so distant from the experience of most contracting parties. For sophisticated parties,
courts might consider enforcing terms that they would otherwise refuse to enforce. For
example, current contract law doctrine forbids the enforcement of "punishment clauses."
These are terms that impose higher than compensatory damages on a party that does not
perform at all, or that performs below the standards demanded by the contract (even
though terms of this sort actually have origins deep in the history of Anglo-American
contract law and were enforced for centuries). 70 However, there is a good argument that
in agreements between the kinds of parties discussed here, such provisions should be en-
forced. 7 1 For such parties, we no longer suspect that the terms were imposed upon them
within a one-sided commercial relationship. These parties might reasonably accept pen-
66. See, e.g., BIx, CONTRACT LAW supra note 4, at 87-92 (giving an overview of historical and current sub-
stantive fairness restrictions on contract enforcement).
67. This observation has also been made by Richard Craswell. See, e.g., Property Rules and Liability Rules
in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CI. L. REv. 1, 34-44 (1993).
68. There is a weak sense of consent in parties going forward with a transaction knowing (or at least having
reason to know of) the mandatory terms or the possibility of judicial rewriting of terms. However, this type of
consent is hardly stronger than the consent to boilerplate terms that Radin properly complains about in her text.
69. See e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Eu-
ropean Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions, Oct 7, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/research/press/2013/pdf/jtiliip communication.pdf.
70. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION
OF ASSUMPSIT 88-135 (1975); DAvID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
28-30 (1999).




alty clauses as a way of proving their commitment to perform (which may be necessary
to gain serious consideration if they are new or unproven in their area of business). For
similar reasons, one can think of situations where sophisticated parties might have a rea-
son to want "naked promises" or "illusory promises" enforced, or the power to modify
agreements without new consideration. 72
However, one difficulty with such a two-track approach to contracts is that it may
not be easy to draw useful guidelines regarding which parties qualify for which set of
rules. One suggestion that business-to-business ("B2B") contracts receive separate
treatments (a view strongly advocated by Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, in their well-
known article Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law)73 runs into the problem
that many small business owners may be as vulnerable and in as much need of regulatory
protection as are most consumers and employees. 74
CONCLUSION
The modern contracting practices that most consumers, employees, and others face
are not ones of "freedom of contract" in anything like the full meaning of that ideal. As
Margaret Radin reminds us in Boilerplate, the situation is often closer to the unilateral
imposition of terms by the stronger or more sophisticated side. This does not mean, and
should not mean, that such contracts or particular contractual provisions should never be
enforced. It does mean that there are substantial (though perhaps far from conclusive)
arguments for some regulatory limits-some mandatory terms or prohibited terms as in
European Union Contract Law, or at least some presumptions for or against certain
terms. At the same time, this sort of regulation brings its own problems-political, prac-
tical, and doctrinal-so it should be approached cautiously.
It is important not to overstate the complaints against boilerplate provisions. For
example, arguments that boilerplate language undermines the rule of law or the public-
private distinction overlook the extent to which contractual waiver of rights has been ex-
pressly or implicitly authorized by state and federal legislation and case law. And the
way that legislatures have been willing to encourage or at least condone boilerplate
should make one cautious about the likelihood of legislative regulation of such terms.
Freedom of contract remains an important ideal, especially for those in the best po-
sition to enjoy all the benefits from contractual arrangements. At the same time that one
might consider limitations on contractual freedom to protect more vulnerable parties in
their contractual interactions, one might consider an expansion of "freedom of contract"
for transactions among the more powerful and sophisticated parties. Perhaps some of the
72. Modifications are already enforceable without new consideration for sales of goods. See UCC § 2-
209(1) ("[an agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding"). But
the rule for non-sale of goods transactions is far less clear. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71
(1981) (general requirement of consideration); id. at § 89 (creating limited exceptions for enforcing modifica-
tions without consideration).
73. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541,
556 (2003). Part of Schwartz and Scott's argument was that businesses do not have the same autonomy inter-
ests in their contracts that individuals do.
74. See Martijn W. Hesselink, Unfair Terms in Contracts Between Businesses, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW 131, 13148 (Jules Stuyck & Reiner Schulze eds., 2011).
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existing doctrinal rules meant to protect weaker parties might be lifted for contracting
parties that do have real choices and are not regularly subject to exploitation or manipu-
lation.
In Boilerplate, one finds an important warning on how far vendors and employers
have gone to remove or disable legal protections through contract. And if one considers
some of the book's claims to be somewhat overstated, perhaps this is the inevitable and
acceptable cost of an important call to arms.

